Corporatism versus Social Democracy: Divergent Fortunes of the Austrian and Swedish Labour Movements

CHRISTOPH KUNKEL and JONAS PONTUSSON In Austria, the social democrats suffered major electoral losses in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, and these losses translated primarily into gains for right-wing populism. In Sweden, by contrast, the social democrats have pretty much held their own in recent elections (except for 1991) and protest voting has assumed leftist as well as rightist forms. Commonly regarded as prototypical instances of 'corporatism', the two countries have also diverged with respect to union density, which fell precipitously in Austria while it rose in Sweden from 1970 to 1990. This dual divergence suggests that strong unions remain an important electoral asset for social-democratic parties. The divergent trajectories of trade-union membership are in turn related to differences between Austrian and Swedish corporatism.
This article addresses two related but distinct questions. The first question concerns the electoral fortunes of social-democratic parties and the ideological hegemony of social democracy in an era of internationalisation and liberalisation of advanced capitalist political economies. Comparing Austria and Sweden, we ask, why is it that the SPO {Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs) has experienced a succession of severe electoral setbacks while its Swedish sister party, the SAP {Socialdemokratiska arbetarpartiet), has pretty much held its own over the last 15-20 years? And why is it that in Austria social-democratic electoral losses have been primarily translated into gains for a populist protest party of the radical right, while in Sweden social-democratic losses primarily have been translated into gains for other left parties? The second question concerns the fortunes of trade unions, traditional supporters and allies of socialdemocratic parties: why is it that union density fell precipitously in Austria in the 1970s and 1980s, while it rose in Sweden?
The broad brush-stroke pictures of Austria and Sweden provided by the corporatism literature suggest that these political economies are very much 2 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS alike. At first sight, then, comparing these two countries would seem to represent an almost ideal 'most similar systems' design, making it possible to identify the causes of decline in the social-democratic parties and trade unions with a great deal of precision. 1 However, a more detailed look at these cases yields many striking contrasts, which can plausibly be invoked as explanations of the divergent outcomes that concern us here. The goals of this article are essentially heuristic to identify puzzles and to suggest arguments or hypotheses. More rigorous causal analysis would require a more closely-matched pair of country cases or an altogether different research design.
It is not the case that Austria and Sweden have 'corporatism' in common while they differ in other respects, for some of the most interesting differences between Austria and Sweden concern the extent and character of corporatist arrangements. Sweden's claim to rank at the top of the corporatist league hinges on the highly centralised system of economy-wide wage bargaining that came into being in the 1950s. For our present purposes, the voluntary basis of Swedish labour market organisations and wage bargaining or, conversely, the limited extent of direct state intervention deserve to be emphasised. Also, the role of tripartite commissions and administrative boards in the realm of public policy has sometimes been exaggerated. The well-known story of the introduction of the ATP pension system, passed by a one-vote parliamentary majority in 1959, illustrates the continued role of class mobilisation and partisan conflict during the heyday of post-war consensus in Sweden. 2 Austria was always more corporatist than Sweden or, more to the point, the post-war Austrian variety of corporatism approximated to the original meaning of the term 'corporatism' more closely than its Swedish counterpart. By comparison with Sweden, four features of Austrian corporatism stand out. 3 First, three of its four organisational pillars, the chambers of Labour, Business, and Agriculture, are based on mandatory membership, the only voluntary pillar being the union movement. Second, the Austrian case is distinguished by a more complete interpenetration of parties and interest groups as illustrated, on the one hand, by the existence of party factions within all the major interest groups and, on the other hand, by the large number of interest-group officials who serve as MPs. Third, the Austrian proporz system, whereby the main political families (Lagers) are represented in public administration and the management of nationalised industry, has no equivalent in the Swedish case. And, finally, the Austrian tradition of coalition government deserves to be mentioned here. At the federal level, the SPO and its main rival, the Christian-democratic 6VP (Osterreichische Volkspartei), have governed jointly for 31 of the 52 years since the end of the Second World War and, even when a single party has Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06: 23 20 January 2015 held all cabinet posts, the federal structure of the Austrian state has entailed significant power-sharing.
Austria and Sweden can also be contrasted in terms of the trajectories of corporatism since the late 1970s. Whether or not a general decline of corporatism has occurred is a matter of debate among students of advanced capitalist political economies, but everyone agrees that Sweden is a case of corporatist decline, and that employers have been the key instigators of corporatist decline in the Swedish case." Since the early 1980s, Sweden's export-oriented engineering employers have successfully pushed for more decentralised forms of wage bargaining and, in the early 1990s, the employers' association simply withdrew its representatives from tripartite boards of state agencies. In Austria, too, corporatist arrangements -in particular, mandatory membership in the Kammer system -have recently been called into question. However, this challenge has come from new political parties rather than employers, and has yet to be transformed into any major institutional changes. 5 Broadly speaking, then, Austria might be characterised as a case of corporatist stability and social-democratic decline and Sweden as a case of social-democratic stability and corporatist decline. This twofold divergence serves to make the relationship between 'corporatism' and 'social democracy' problematic and calls into question the common practice of conflating the two concepts. 6 In what follows, we do not propose a single explanation of the divergent fortunes of the Austrian and Swedish labour movements, rather, we set out an explanatory framework that draws on the analytical concerns of comparative political economy and emphasises the legacies of past policy choices as well as cross-national differences in the organisation of trade unions and union-party relations. Two basic themes connect the various strands of our discussion. First, we argue that strong unions remain an important electoral asset for social-democratic parties. Second, we argue that the Austrian variety of corporatism has reinforced the dominant position of male industrial workers within the union movement, and constrained the ability of Austrian unions to mobilise new categories of wage earners. Prior to the development of these arguments, we first elaborate further on the outcomes to be explained and engage in a critique of alternative analytical perspectives.
DIVERGENT OUTCOMES: ELECTORAL SUPPORT AND UNION DENSITY
For both countries, Table 1 shows the share of popular vote polled by socialdemocratic parties and the entire Left in each national election since 1970. The Left's total vote includes votes cast for Greens and communist or postcommunist parties as well as for social-democratic parties. 7 In Austria, the Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 Communist Party was thoroughly marginalised during the Cold War, and the difference between the SPO's vote share and that of the entire Left was very small until the Greens made their appearance as an electoral contender in 1983. In Sweden, by contrast, the Communist Party survived the Cold War, and renamed itself the Left Party-Communists as part of an opening to the 'New Left' in the 1960s. In 1990, the party dropped the reference to 'communism' altogether, so that it is now known simply as the Left Party. Name changes notwithstanding, the party has cleared the four per cent threshold of parliamentary representation in every post-war election but one (1968), and accounts for the lion's share of the difference between the SAP's share of the vote and that of the entire Left until 1988, when the Greens cleared the threshold of four per cent for the first time.
As Table 1 shows, the SPO did much better than the SAP at the polls in the 1970s. Exceeding 50 per cent in three consecutive elections, the SPO's vote share was larger than that of the entire Swedish left from 1971 through to the end of the decade. This impressive string of electoral victories provided the basis for majoritarian social-democratic government fromformed a coalition government with the liberal FPO (Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs), but the FPO proved to be an unstable coalition partner. By 1986, the right wing of the FPO, headed by the charismatic J8rg Haider, had taken over the party, triggering a government crisis and new elections. As the SPO again suffered heavy losses, it could only remain in power by forming a grand coalition government with the OVP.
The 1983 election proved to be the first of four consecutive setbacks for the SPO, and three of these setbacks were quite severe. Remarkably, the SPO's share of the vote fell from 51 per cent in 1979 to 34.9 per cent in 1994. While the Greens gained support in every election over this period, their gains were sufficient to offset social-democratic losses in only one election (1990) and, consequently, the Left's total share of the vote declined significantly as well. Polling 38.1 per cent of the vote, the SPO staged something of a recovery in the extraordinary election of 1995, but the Left's total share increased by less than one percentage point. As noted by numerous post-election commentaries, the fear that the election might yield an OVP-FPO coalition government seems to have led some left-leaning voters with green sympathies to cast their votes for the SPO in 1995. 8 By historical standards, the 1970s were a difficult decade for the Swedish social democrats. Following a brief stint of majoritarian government (1968-70), the SAP governed on a minority basis from 1970 to 1976, seeking to strike issue-specific deals with one of the parties of the centre (the Centre Party and the Liberals) and, in absence of such deals, relying on the Left Party's unwillingness to join the bourgeois parties against the government. Relatively minor electoral losses for both SAP and the Left Party in 1976 led to a reversal of government and opposition, and the bourgeois parties again prevailed by a narrow margin in 1979. Gains scored by both the SAP and the Left Party enabled the social democrats to return to power in 1982 -again relying on shifting legislative alliances to govern -and two subsequent elections in the 1980s confirmed Sweden's return to a situation of electoral dominance by the Left.
The election of 1991 represents a sharp departure from the Swedish pattern of electoral stability. While the SAP and the Left Party both suffered major losses, the Greens fell below the four-per-cent threshold in this election. On the bourgeois side, the Conservatives regained the momentum they had enjoyed in the early 1980s while the Centre Party and the Liberals continued to lose support, but the big winners were two bourgeois parties that had not previously been represented in parliament: the Christian Democrats and the populist New Democracy Party. As in the 1970s, the bourgeois parties took over the reins of government just as the economy faltered and this, along with New Democracy's failure to sustain its appeal among potential protest voters, set the stage for yet another comeback for Downloaded by [ Going beyond the evidence in Table 1 , it should be noted that support for the SAP in public-opinion polls plummeted in 1995-96, and the SAP polled only 28 per cent of the vote in Sweden's first European Parliament (EP) elections in the autumn of 1995, less than what the SPO polled in Austria's first EP elections in the following spring (29 per cent). In retrospect, the social-democratic victory of 1994 may prove to have been an aberration and the defeat of 1991 a crucial turning point -the beginning of an erosion of electoral support of proportions quite similar to that experienced by the SPO from 1979 to 1994. On the other hand, popular support for the SAP improved during 1997 and, in view of the current economic recovery as well as recent electoral victories for the Left in Italy, Britain and France, this trend may continue through the election campaign of 1998. Be that as it may, the crucial point is that the SAP's loss of popular support in 1995-96 was transformed into remarkable gains for the Left Party and the Greens, and that a majority of voters continues to express support for one of the leftwing parties. This situation stands in sharp contrast to that of Austria, where social-democratic losses have primarily been converted into right-wing populist gains. 9 As indicated at the outset, we are concerned not only with the electoral fortunes of social-democratic parties, but also with the mobilisational capacity and political influence of trade unions, traditional supporters and allies of the social-democratic parties. Union density represents a commonly used quantitative measure of union power, and on this score the Austrian and Swedish cases diverge even more sharply than they do with respect to electoral support for the left. As shown in Table 2 , the labour movements of these two countries entered the 1970s at roughly similar levels of unionisation, but from 1970 to 1992, Austria's rate of union density fell from 62 per cent to 43 per cent while Sweden's rate increased from 68 per cent to 91 per cent. 10 In proportion to prior levels, the Austrian figures represent the second-largest union density decline of any European OECD country over this period (France being in first place).
Union members have traditionally been and remain more likely to vote for the Left than non-union members in both Austria and Sweden. Hence explaining the divergence of union density trends should take us some way towards an explanation of the divergence of electoral fortunes in the 1980s and 1990s. But the divergence of union density also represents an important outcome in and of itself, with important implications for the politics of 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
For Austrian political scientists, the problem of explaining the electoral decline of the SPO has largely been subsumed under the problem of explaining increased voter volatility and diminishing support for both of the major parties. The 'decline of the Lager mentality' sums up the basic theme of this literature, which shows that voters have become more individualistic and issue-oriented, and that party leaders, election campaigns, and mass media have become increasingly influential." From the comparative perspective adopted here, this way of thinking about the decline of social democracy is obviously problematic, for the variables invoked to explain the SPO's electoral difficulties are by no means unique to the Austrian case. Similar developments have been observed by Swedish students of electoral behaviour, yet they have not meant comparable electoral losses for the SAP. This article seeks to illustrate how the concerns of comparative political economy might be linked to the analysis of electoral outcomes. Relative to the mainstream of comparative political economy, we correct for the tendency to neglect electoral politics and, relative to the political economy tradition that does address electoral outcomes, we go beyond its almost exclusive preoccupation with the implications of macro-economic performance. As shown in Table 3 , Austria consistently averaged higher rates of real GDP growth and lower rates of inflation than Sweden from 1970 through to the first half of the 1990s. From 1976 to 1991, the Austrian rate of unemployment was higher than the Swedish, but the Austrians were much more successful than the Swedes in keeping the lid on mass unemployment in the first half of the 1990s. Had the Austrian and Swedish social democrats held government power throughout this period (1970- Restricting the comparison of macro-economic performance to periods of social-democratic government, the difference in unemployment rates in the 1980s constitutes the only hook on which one might hang a straightforward macro-economic explanation of divergent electoral fortunes. It seems far-fetched to think that a one-percentage-point unemployment differential, albeit one that persisted for about a decade, could have such large electoral consequences. On the other hand, the timing of business cycles and elections clearly constitutes a crucial component of the electoral success of the Swedish social democrats. Macro-economic performance deteriorated markedly during periods of bourgeois government -in each case, the 'misery index' (unemployment plus inflation) jumped while the growth of real GDP plummeted (see Table 3 ) -and this, in turn, served to boost electoral support for the SAP. In a sense, the Swedish social democrats have been extraordinarily lucky, twice losing power just as the economy entered a deep recession. Indeed, there may be more than simply luck at work here: in the mid-1970s, the policies pursued by the social democrats in effect postponed the impact of the international recession until 1976, and social-democratic policy choices in the 1980s were at least in part responsible for the Swedish employment crisis of the early 1990s. 12 The puzzle is why (or how) the SAP managed to avoid being blamed for economic difficulties, and why the SPO has received so little credit for Austria's stable and rather strong macro-economic performance.
Economic voting models are limited by their focus on 'swing voters' at the centre of the political spectrum, and by their conception of these voters Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 as individuals without strong ideological commitments or distributive interests, responding to the movement of macro-economic indicators much like market actors respond to price changes. Quite obviously, such models leave unanswered questions about the size of the swing electorate and, for multi-party systems, the direction of its swings in response to poor economic performance -to the Left or to the Right of the government of the day? As we seek to understand variations in the centre of political gravity across countries and over time, we need to pay more attention to the core constituencies of different parties. Until quite recently, the core constituency of both the SPO and the SAP was unquestionably the industrial working class. Could it be that the divergence of their electoral fortunes, and perhaps the divergence of union density as well, is attributable to a more rapid shift of employment out of industry into services, that is, a greater shrinkage of the industrial working class in Austria than in Sweden? Table 4 shows that the opposite is in fact the case: with industry accounting for just about the same proportion of total employment in both countries in 1968, Sweden underwent much more rapid deindustrialisation than Austria over the next two decades. At the same time, Table 4 points to the size of the public-service sector as a major difference between our two cases. Already in 1968, the public sector was a more important source of employment in Sweden than in Austria and, while its share of total employment grew in both countries in the 1970s and the 1980s, this growth was stronger in Sweden. 13 As we shall see, public-sector employees have become an increasingly important constituency for unions and social-democratic parties in both countries.
In a recent book on European social democracy, and an article devoted exclusively to a comparison of the SPO and the SAP, Herbert Kitschelt Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06: 23 20 January 2015 argues that the expansion of education and 'people-processing' occupations in the service sector, especially public services, since the 1960s has given rise to a new cleavage axis in Western European politics, and that the challenge facing social democratic parties is to reposition themselves so as to appeal to voters with 'left-libertarian' values.
14 For Kitschelt, the behaviour of other parties may constrain the ability of social democratic parties to realign themselves, but strategic innovation and electoral success is first and foremost a function of party organisation and internal party politics. Kitschelt's discussion of the organisational conditions for strategic flexibility is subtle and complex; what matters for our present purposes is his claim that union influence over party organisation and decision making represents an obstacle to the kind of programmatic realignment that is necessary to achieve electoral success.
Writing between the Swedish elections of 1991 and 1994, Kitschelt conceives both Austria and Sweden as cases of'social democracy in crisis'. His comparison of these cases does not turn on differences in union influence, and makes no mention of divergent union-density trends. Thus Kitschelt misses the dual divergence of electoral fortunes and trends in union density noted above. As Kitschelt's thesis of union-induced strategic rigidity is first and foremost an argument about union influence within the party (vis-a-vis party leaders and non-union constituencies), it is not necessarily contradicted by this dual divergence. However, to invoke Kitschelt's thesis as an explanation of the electoral outcomes that we seek to explain, one would have to argue that union influence over the socialdemocratic parties has been significantly greater in Austria than in Sweden, which is not by any means self-evident. The closest Kitschelt himself comes to making this claim is his assertion that 'the party-union linkage has been closer in Austria than in Sweden'. 15 
INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND SWEDEN
To go beyond the preliminary discussion of the previous section, it is necessary to look more closely at the organisation of unions, party-union relations and other institutional features that distinguish the Austrian and Swedish cases from each other. Against the background provided in the following pages, subsequent sections will more directly address electoral outcomes and trends in union density. 16 
Union Organisation
As in the case of West Germany, the post-war reconstruction of the Austrian trade-union movement was based on the twin principles of political unity and industrial unionism. The first principle meant that social democrats, Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 communists and Christian Democratic union activists would be part of the same unions, and that these unions would not be formally affiliated to any party. The establishment of a separate union for privately employed whitecollar employees (Privatangestellte) compromised the principle of industrial unionism -workers organised on the basis of their employer (sectors) rather than the jobs they perform -but the upshot was still a remarkably coherent structure. Today, there are but 14 national unions in Austria, all affiliated to the OGB (Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund): four public-sector unions, which organise blue-collar and white-collar employees alike, nine blue-collar unions for the private sector, organised on an industrial basis, and one white-collar union for the entire private sector.
In Sweden, by contrast, no unions organise both blue-collar and whitecollar employees, and the blue-collar unions affiliated to the LO (Landsorganisationeri) have always had official ties to the SAP. In effect, there is not one, but two union movements in Sweden: a socialdemocratic blue-collar union movement, and a politically neutral (unitary) white-collar union movement. The white-collar union movement is in turn divided into two separate confederations, the TCO (Tjanstemdnnens Centralorganisatiori) and the SACO-SR (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation-Statstjanstemannens Riksfbrbund). While the TCO, like the LO, is organised on the basis of industrial unionism, and seeks to represent all white-collar employees, membership in the SACO-SR is largely restricted to people with academic or professional degrees, and its affiliates are organised on the basis of professions. 17 
Union-Party Relations
In Austria, the principle of political neutrality has been coupled with formalised politicisation of internal union affairs. Factions affiliated with the two major parties, the SPO and the OVP, run candidate slates in works council elections, and the results of these elections provide the basis for allocation of union offices among the factions. The Socialist Trade-Union Faction (Fraktion Sozialistischer Gewerkschafter, henceforth FSG) usually receives 65-70 per cent of the votes in works council elections, while the Christian Trade-Union Faction and various independent groups receive 15-20 per cent each. 18 By similar means, but with somewhat smaller margins, the FSG also dominates the Chamber of Labour (Arbeiterkammef), based on compulsory membership for all wage earners. With official representation on the executive committee of the SPO, the FSG is the direct link between the three pillars of the Austrian labour movement.
Until the SAP officially abolished collective affiliation in the late 1980s, it was the common practice of the branches of LO unions to affiliate to the district party of their locality, with individual union members being Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06: 23 20 January 2015 provided the opportunity to opt out of collective affiliation. Roughly 75 per cent of SAP members were affiliated through their unions when this practice ended. In contrast to the British Labour Party, collective affiliation was a local matter, and did not involve 'bloc votes' at party congresses. Rather, local union leaders cast proxy votes for collectively affiliated members in pre-congress deliberations at the district party level, and this remains possible under the new rules adopted by the SAP congress of 1987 -the difference being that the influence of local union leaders now depends on their ability to get their membership to join the SAP individually." At the national level, the only formal tie between the LO and the SAP is the exofficio appointment of the LO president as a member of the party's executive committee.
While the SAP has no formal ties to white-collar unions, it began to promote social-democratic activism within the TCO unions in the 1950s and, by the 1970s, the TCO leadership began to acquire a distinctively social-democratic profile. 20 More or less formalised consultations, personal contacts and people holding official positions in both wings of the labour movement are, of course, crucial features of LO-SAP and OGB-SPO relations as well. Whereas dual office-holding rarely occurs at the national level in Sweden, this has been and remains common practice in Austria. High-ranking officials of labour associations (unions and Arbeiterkammer) accounted for 45-48 per cent of all SPO MPs in the 1970s, a figure which had only fallen to 38 per cent by 1991. Small wonder, then, that 'the FSG and the SPO traditionally had identical or similar positions on most issues'. 21 It is difficult to compare the SPO-OGB pair and the SAP-LO pair in terms of the balance of power between party and unions. As Kitschelt points out, the separation of party and union functions is more pronounced in the Swedish case. However, this does not mean that the LO has stayed out of politics. Quite the contrary, the LO appears to have been more assertive in the political arena than the OGB. It is well-known that some of the most innovative and distinctive features of the Swedish Model, such as active labour-market policy, were conceived by people inside the LO, and that the LO provided the clout that ensured that these policies would prevail against the resistance of some party leaders. The autonomous political role of the LO reached its apogee in the 1970s, with the LO initiating major reforms on its own: first, co-determination, and then wage-earner funds. 22 The failure of the latter initiative clearly weakened the LO's influence within the SAP, but the LO and its affiliated unions have continued to play a very active role in the political debate -in the 1990s, as critics of the policy priorities of bourgeois and social-democratic governments alike.
According to Wolfgang Miiller, conflicts between the union and party Downloaded by [ 23 By comparison with Sweden, this represents a belated development and, overall, the posture of the OGB appears to have been more defensive than that of the LO. Why, then, has the OGB been politically more docile than the LO? Our tentative answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand, the need to accommodate the Christian Trade-Union Faction and other non-socialist forces within the OGB, institutionalised by the system of proportional representation, has served as a constraint on socialist trade-union activists and leaders. On the other hand, the conditions of coalition government have strengthened the moderates within the SPO leadership, reducing the scope for successful trade-union initiatives.
Electoral Competition
The divergent fortunes of the Austrian and Swedish social democracy cannot be explained entirely by looking at the social-democratic parties and their union allies. As Kitschelt has rightly emphasised, the nature of the competition confronting these parties in the electoral arena must also be taken into account. Leaving aside the recent rise of radical-right populism in Austria, there are two important differences between Austria and Sweden on this score, to which we have already alluded.
First, there is a party to the Left of social democrats in Sweden, but not in Austria, and this is a party with a tradition of appealing to blue-collar workers. The reasons why this is so need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that the SAP has always had to worry about losing left-leaning as well as right-leaning supporters, and that this has strengthened the influence of leftist forces within the party. Also, the Left Party has become a vehicle of protest voting in the last decade or so. Had such a party existed in Austria, the rise of the FPO would perhaps have been less meteoric, and the SPO's room for strategic manoeuvring greater. 24 The second difference concerns the nature of the competition to the Right. Divisions among the bourgeois parties have often been invoked as one of the main reasons for the historic dominance of social democracy in Sweden, and Scandinavia more generally. 25 Coalitions with the Agrarian (now Centre) Party enabled the SAP to consolidate control of the government in the 1930s and to stay in government despite electoral setbacks in the 1950s. On many issues, the social democrats have been able to play the three bourgeois parties off against one another. Indeed, during the 1960s and the 1970s, the Centre Party and the Liberals often sought to project themselves as more progressive than the SAP on issues such as codetermination, gender equality and the environment. By contrast, the SPO essentially confronted a single competitor during most of the post-war eraa party (the OVP) with broad popular appeal, strong connections to the Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015
Catholic Church, and well-organised core constituencies. Even at the peak of its electoral dominance in the 1970s, the SPO was a party competing for hegemony rather than a hegemonic party.
Post-War Political Economies
Sweden exemplifies Esping-Andersen's conception of a social-democratic welfare state, characterised by universalism, decommodification and an emphasis on directly provided services over transfer payments. 26 To characterise Austria, in the 1980s or 1990s, as a conservative welfare state is surely somewhat misleading, but with respect to most of the features that come into play in Esping-Andersen's analysis, the Austrian welfare state diverges from the social democratic model in a conservative direction. First, transfer payments (social insurance) constitute a significantly larger component of total welfare benefits provided by the state in Austria than Sweden. This is indicated by the fact that while social security as a percentage of GDP was roughly the same in 1990 (just below 20 per cent), total government spending as a percentage of GDP was much higher in Sweden (60.8 per cent) than in Austria (49.4 per cent) and also by the greater relative importance of public-sector employment in Sweden (Table  4) . Second, occupational distinctions remain important features of social insurance in Austria. Third, the major social insurance schemes (pensions, sick pay and unemployment) provide lower rates of average earnings replacement than in Sweden. Finally, the financing of social insurance relies more heavily on individual contributions, relative to payroll taxes and general tax revenues."
It is a commonplace argument that universalism shores up political support for the welfare state by providing the middle class with material stakes in its maintenance. Construed as an explanation of the divergent electoral fortunes of the SPO and the SAP, this line of argument would lead us to expect that the SPO has primarily lost support among white-collar strata. As we shall see, this is not the case. Still, welfare-state universalism may be an important ideological variable at work here. 28 And, again, publicsector employment provides an important linkage between patterns of postwar welfare-state development and electoral outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s.
The role of public-sector employment expansion as a mechanism to bring women into the labour force in Sweden deserves to be noted here. Austria. 29 Mostly due to the differences in female labour-force participation, Sweden also outpaced Austria in terms of total labour-force participation in the 1970s and 1980s (83.2 per cent as compared to 67.7 per cent in 1990). While both countries avoided mass unemployment, Swedish employment policy was clearly more ambitious than its Austrian counterpart. It is also noteworthy that Austria is at the very bottom, and Sweden at the top, when OECD countries are ranked by the share of GDP devoted to active labourmarket policy. 30 The differences between the size of the public sector in Austria and Sweden diminish if nationalised industry is included. In 1983-84, stateowned enterprises accounted for 18 per cent of industrial employment in Austria, and 9.5 per cent in Sweden. As commonly noted, nationalised industry has been an important tool of employment policy and a bastion of union strength in Austria. 3 ' This distinctive feature of Austria's post-war political economy may be linked to the decline of social democracy in at least two ways. First, in the 1980s, participation in the management of nationalised industry involved the union movement, as well as socialdemocratic officials, in a series of scandals relating to patronage, misappropriation of funds, and illegal arms deals with foreign countries. Second, the importance of the nationalised sector to the union movement would appear to have reinforced the dominance of skilled, male workers and their interests, and perhaps constrained the ability of the OGB to extend and rejuvenate its membership base.
Related to this last point, it is well-known that Sweden has the most egalitarian wage structure of any OECD country, but it is commonly overlooked that Austria has the largest inter-sectoral wage differentials and the largest gap between average male and female earnings of any rich European country. 32 Initiated by the LO, solidaristic wage policy emerged as a central feature of the Swedish model in 1960s, and became official policy of the TCO unions as well in the 1970s. By contrast, the OGB never committed itself strongly and consistently to wage solidarity and, in practice, its approach to wage bargaining has been guided by the idea that in order to preserve employment wages must be allowed to vary according to corporate profitability. 33 Now, the determinants of wage-distributive outcomes are complex, and union policy is certainly only part of the story. For our present purposes, it is the implications of the politics of wage distribution for the mobilisational capacity of unions and the electoral fortunes of social-democratic parties that matter.
ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE DISAGGREGATED
Perhaps the most obvious way to adjudicate among contending explanations Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 of the electoral decline of Austrian social democracy is to ask, who abandoned the SPO in the 1980s and early 1990s? Contrary to what a macro-economic account of electoral performance would lead us to expect, the SPO's electoral losses in this period were indeed concentrated in particular segments of the electorate, but it is not the case that the SPO primarily lost support among middle-class voters tired of paying high taxes.
For both Austria and Sweden, Table 5 traces the social democrats' share of the votes cast by various socio-economic and demographic categories of voters over a number of recent elections (1979-94 for Sweden and 1986-95 for Austria). 34 Relating the social democrats' share of the votes cast by a particular category of voters to their share of the total vote, it is possible to identify the constituencies where they have the greatest support as well as the constituencies where they are weak. Also, relative gains and losses can be identified by relating the change in vote share for a particular voter category to the change in the total vote over the time period in question. The following analysis compares the SPO and the SAP on both counts, but, of course, the question of change over time is of primary importance for our present purposes.
Looking at the mid-1980s figures, there are strong similarities between the SAP and the SPO in terms of their bases of support. Most notably, both parties enjoyed a huge electoral edge among blue-collar voters and union members. The SAP's share of the blue-collar vote was a huge 20 points higher than its share of the total vote, and its share of the union vote was 10 points higher than its share of the total vote." The corresponding figures for the SPO were +14 and +19. On the other hand, both parties did very poorly among students and the self-employed, and also underpeformed among white-collar voters. The SAP's share of the white-collar vote fell short of its share of the total vote by ten points. On this score, the SPO did significantly better (-3), and this is all the more impressive because the Austrian figures on white-collar voters do not include civil servants (Beamte) and, as shown in Table 5 , civil servants (+6) were more inclined to vote for the SPO than any socio-economic category other than blue-collar workers. This distinctive feature of the Austrian case is perhaps related to the politicisation of administrative appointments. In general, however, the SPO did as well among private-sector employees as it did among public-sector employees, which is also true for the SAP.
Both parties enjoyed an edge among retired voters, matched by poor performance among young voters. This pattern is more pronounced for the SPO, whose share of the retired vote exceeded its share of the total vote by six points, and whose share of the under-30 vote fell four points short (SAP: +2 and -3). Finally, gap would appear to be entirely attributable to stronger-than-average support among working women. While the SPO's share of the female wageearner vote exceeded its share of the total vote by three points, its share of the housewife vote was seven points lower than its share of the total vote. experience can be summarised as follows. From 1979 to 1995, the SAP suffered considerable losses among blue-collar workers, and especially among blue-collar workers in the private sector. While its share of the total vote increased by two points, its share of the blue-collar vote and the private-sector vote declined by three points, which, in our terminology, equals a relative loss of 5 ('-5'). The SAP suffered roughly similar losses among young voters, and also lost some support among women. For all other categories of voters, the Swedish social democrats either held their own or made disproportionate gains. Their gains among white-collar voters and public-sector employees (+6 for both categories) are particularly noteworthy. The SPO suffered a severe haemorrhage of blue-collar support from 1986 to 1995. Altogether, the party's share of the blue-collar vote fell by 16 percentage points. Relative to the change in its share of the total vote, this represents a loss of 11 points (as compared to 5 points for the SAP). As in the case of the SAP, the SPO's losses among blue-collar workers appear to have been concentrated in the private sector, but the SPO, in marked contrast to the SAP, also suffered relative losses among white-collar workers (-3) and public-sector employees (-2). The large relative loss of support among female wage earners (-6) is noteworthy as well, but, again, the SPO also lost greaterthan-average support among male wage earners (-2). Indeed, the SPO suffered relative losses among all categories of wage earners except civil servants. Its relative gains occurred among students, the self-employed, housewives, civil servants and retired people, all of whom, except the selfemployed, might perhaps be characterised as 'welfare state claimants'.
The evidence in Table 5 suggests that the SPO faced a steeper trade-off between white-collar and blue-collar support than the SAP: that is, gaining a certain amount of support (or minimizing losses) among white-collar voters entailed a larger loss of blue-collar support than it did for the SAP." This is rather puzzling given that blue-collar and white-collar employees belong to the same unions or, at least, the same union confederation in Austria -a situation that one might expect to be more favourable to the formation of a wage-earner political identity than the Swedish one. Evidently, rates of unionisation matter more than union structure in this context. Table 6 tracks the differences in the vote share between men and women, between private-sector and public-sector employees, and between bluecollar and white-collar employees for social democratic parties and the entire Left in Austria and Sweden over the period 1985-95. The first panel shows that women have tended to be more left-leaning than men in both countries, but this gender gap diminished in Sweden in the 1990s. For the SAP alone, the gender gap actually reversed itself in 1994. Also, the first Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 panel of Table 6 shows that the Greens attracted many left-leaning Austrian women in 1994, and that these voters swung back to the SPO in 1995.
In the second panel, we observe that in Sweden public-sector employees have been more inclined than private-sector employees to vote for the Left in every election since 1985, but until 1991, this gap manifested itself primarily through above-average public-sector support for leftist parties other than the SAP. In 1991 and 1994, however, the private-public vote differential became more evenly distributed between the SAP and the other leftist parties. In relative terms, Austrian public-sector employees became more left-wing in the 1990s. In the first instance, this shift benefited the Greens, but public-sector employees swung sharply towards the SPO in 1995. As a whole, the Swedish Left continues to enjoy a much larger edge than the Austrian Left among public-sector employees.
Finally, the third panel of Table 6 shows that while the SAP's reliance on blue-collar support declined significantly from 1985 to 1994, the blueDownloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 collar/white-collar differential in support for the left as a whole remained essentially constant in Sweden over this period. Apparently, other leftist parties, most obviously the Left Party, have been able to mobilise many disaffected working-class voters. In Austria, by contrast, total voting for the left has been in close parallel with the SPO in terms of the decline of the blue-collar/white-collar differential.
This analysis suggests that the contrast in electoral performance between the SAP and the SPO has two quite distinct components. On the one hand, the SPO has lost support among male blue-collar workers in the private sector to the FPO. Many of these workers are likely to be unskilled and relatively poorly paid; certainly, they are likely to perceive themselves as economically insecure. The SAP has also lost support within this constituency, but its losses have been smaller, and protest voting among blue-collar workers has assumed more leftist forms in Sweden than in Austria. 38 On the other hand, the SPO has been less successful than the SAP in mobilizing or sustaining its support among women working in public or private services. Working women appear to have abandoned the SPO primarily in favour of the Greens and the Liberal Forum.
TRENDS IN UNION DENSITY
As we have seen, the SPO and the SAP have both enjoyed a significant electoral edge among union members, and this edge has not changed very much since the late 1970s. It would appear that the divergence of their electoral fortunes does not have to do with the ability of union allies to deliver the votes of their members. By the same token, it would appear that a great deal of this divergence can be explained in terms of divergent trends in union density, that is, by the fact that union members today constitute a significantly smaller percentage of the Austrian electorate than they did in the 1970s, while the opposite is true for Sweden. It is time to tackle the question of what accounts for the divergent trends in union density.
It should first be noted that changes in aggregate rates of union density may be due to changes in the composition of the labour force as well as changes in density rates within particular categories of the labour force. Everything else being equal, the rate of union density will decline if the share of total employment of sectors with above-average union density declines. Tables 7 and 8 disaggregate union density by sectors of employment and by gender. The disaggregation by sectors does not go very far, but so far as it goes, Table 7 indicates that a decline in union density has occurred across all sectors of the Austrian economy, and that the rise of union density in Sweden is, similarly, a pervasive rather than sector-specific phenomenon. Holding within-sector rates of union density constant at 1970 levels, employment Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 shifts among the six sectors identified in Table 7 predict a 3.1 percentagepoint decline in aggregate union density in Austria from 1970 to 1988. As aggregate union density actually declined by 14.1 percentage points, we might say that intersectoral employment shifts account for only about onefifth of the total decline in union density. For Sweden, intersectoral employment shifts predict an aggregate decline in density of 2.1 percentage points, but aggregate union density increased by 17.6 points. Table 8 indicates, a significant gap in union density between private and public-sector employees did not open up in Sweden until the 1980s. With union density rates about the same for private and public-sector employees, the expansion of public-sector employment does not explain Sweden's increased union density in the 1970s. In Austria, by contrast, the public sector (not including nationalised industry) was already much more unionised than the private sector in 1970, and the gap remained constant as union density declined in both sectors in the 1970s and 1980s. In this case, the expansion of public-sector employment -less rapid than in Sweden, but still significant (see Table 4 ) -counteracted the decline in union density within sectors.
What might explain the divergence of union density rates within sectors? The first point to be made is that Austrian unions bargain over wages and employment conditions with the Wirtschaftskammer, to which all employers must belong by law. As a result, virtually all employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements, whether or not they themselves are union members. The inherent problem that this poses for the unions has been exacerbated since the early 1980s because the Arbeiterkammer, in response to the erosion of its legitimacy, began to provide a variety of individual, such as legal advice and group insurance, which the unions have traditionally relied upon as selective membership incentives. 41 ' Following a similar logic, the differences between the Austrian and Swedish systems of unemployment insurance might be invoked to explain the divergent trends in union density. Whereas the Austrian system is financed and administered by the state, the Swedish is a Ghent-type system in which the state subsidises union-administered unemployment funds. It is possible to belong to one of these funds without joining the union that runs it, but the Swedish system encourages employees to join unions. 41 The fact that the Swedish rate of union density, which was stagnant in the second half of the 1980s, increased again during the employment crisis of the early 1990s (see Table 2 ) lends credibility to the argument about the significance of unemployment insurance.
To attribute the decline of union density within the industrial sector in Austria to privatisation clearly will not do, for privatisation did not assume significant proportions until the second half of the 1980s. 42 As suggested earlier, it is more plausible to argue that the importance of the nationalised sector for the internal politics of the OGB has constrained its ability to extend its membership base, and especially to recruit low-wage employees in private services. The persistence of a huge gap between male and female rates of union density in Austria is most noteworthy here, particularly in view of the contrast to Sweden, where the female rate has exceeded the male rate since the early 1980s (Table 9 ). When we add differences in rates of Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 female labour-force participation, the following picture emerges: in 1970, women constituted 28 per cent of total union membership in Austria, and 32 per cent in Sweden; by 1994, the Austrian figure was 32 per cent and the Swedish figure 48 per cent. 43 The fact that Swedish working women are far more likely to work in the public sector than their Austrian counterparts clearly constitutes an important reason behind cross-national differences in the relative propensity of male and female wage earners to join unions. Also, there can be no doubt that women have been the principal beneficiaries of solidaristic wage bargaining in Sweden, and it is plausible to suppose that this has drawn female wage earners towards the unions, especially in the absence of any formal provisions for the extension of union contracts to non-union employees.
POLICY CHOICES AND POLITICS
One final question remains to be discussed. Simply put, might the divergent fortunes of the Austrian and Swedish labour movements be attributed to strategic choices made by their leaders? In government, did the Swedish social democrats pursue policies that served to sustain or broaden their electoral support while the Austrian social democrats did not? Space does not permit a detailed comparison of economic and social-policy decisions in Austria and Sweden. The basic point is that in terms of the substance of policy change, the stories to be told about these two countries are strikingly similar. In Austria and Sweden alike, social-democratic governments retreated from selective industrial policy and introduced market-oriented structural reforms in the 1980s. In both cases, structural reforms included various measures to liberalise financial markets, and tax reforms that sharply reduced marginal income tax rates while curtailing deductions and other loopholes. On the benefits side of the welfare state, neither country saw any major cutbacks in the 1980s. As a percentage of GDP or total employment, the growth of the public sector levelled off in the course of this decade, but in absolute (real) terms, public spending and employment continued to increase. The need for fiscal austerity became paramount in the early 1990s, however, and governments in both countries began to cut welfare entitlements and to rationalise and restructure the public sector. In the Swedish case, this reorientation took on radical proportions under the bourgeois government of 1991-94, but it had been initiated by the social democrats in 1990-91, and continued under the social-democratic government of 1994.
In both cases, the decision to apply for membership of the European Union (EU) represents a crucial component of the politics of political and Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 economic reform. Fritz Plasser and Peter Ulram suggest that some of the shift of working-class voters from the SPO to the FPO has been motivated by opposition to EU membership. 44 There can be little doubt that the Swedish social democrats' embrace of the EU has also hurt them among some working-class constituencies, but, again, such losses have led to increased support for other parties of the Left. The divergence between the SAP's and the SPO's fortunes predates the emergence of EU membership as a major political issue and, since the two parties made the same decisions on EU membership, the issue would seem to have limited explanatory relevance. By and large, this assessment holds for tax reform and welfarestate cutbacks as well. With respect to the welfare state, it is clearly not the case that the SPO has moved more forcefully in a neo-liberal direction, thereby alienating traditional working-class supporters to a greater extent than the SAP.
Staying with the focus on economic management and distribution, this leaves two major policy divergences between Austria and Sweden. The first concerns exchange rates and monetary policy. While the Austrian government pegged its currency to the D-Mark in the mid-1970s, and thus abandoned control over interest rates, the Swedish social democrats opted for a large devaluation in 1982, and pursued a more accommodating macroeconomic policy stance through the 1980s. Since Austrian policies yielded better macro-economic performance, however, this policy divergence hardly explains the divergence of electoral outcomes.
The second point of policy divergence concerns the fact that privatisation has been a much more important feature of domestic reform in Austria than in Sweden. This is not so much a question of policy choices in the 1980s, but rather a reflection of the greater prominence of state-owned industry in Austria. In any case, the relevance of this variable for the outcomes we are trying to explain is dubious. As noted earlier, privatisation did not assume significant proportions until the late 1980s in Austria, and therefore could only explain a small part of the unions' membership losses. While privatisation has undoubtedly had an adverse impact on the economic circumstances of some traditional SPO constituencies, it is by no means clear that these are the working-class constituencies that have abandoned the SPO. Specifically, the privatisation of state-owned industry does not seem very relevant to SPO losses among working women. And public opinion in general appears to have been out ahead of the SPO on the privatisation issue.
We do not wish to argue, as a general proposition, that policy choices are of not consequence for the fortunes of social-democratic labour movements. The point is rather that the policy choices that matter for the comparison of Austrian and Swedish social democracy are not so much recent decisions Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 concerning economic liberalisation and welfare-state retrenchment, but rather earlier decisions concerning the size of the public (service) sector, female labour-force participation and wage solidarity. The approach to these issues that Swedish social democrats adopted in the 1960s and 1970s created political and social circumstances favorable to their continued mobilisation of electoral support in the 1980s and 1990s -one of these circumstances being sustained union membership growth. The question of why the Austrian social democrats did not adopt the same approach lies beyond the scope of this article, but it should be clear that any attempt to address this question would have to confront the ideological and cultural legacy of Catholicism, at least as far as the role of women is concerned.
With respect to the 1980s and 1990s, one might well argue that the preceding discussion focuses too narrowly on the substance of new policy initiatives. The framing of policy choices may matter more than their substance. In Sweden, the social democrats' embrace of market-oriented reforms, fiscal austerity and the EU occurred in the context of a sustained campaign by employers to restructure Sweden's political economy, and the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas within the non-socialist bloc. This enabled the social democrats to project themselves as committed to reforming the economy and the state while preserving the basic values of the Swedish model or, in other words, preventing the radical dismantling of the welfare state suggested by the Conservatives' call for a 'system shift'. In comparison with the Swedish case, the Austrian business community remained content and politically quiescent through the 1980s, and the OVP did not seek to project itself as an advocate of radical change until very recently. As a result, the Austrian social democrats were perhaps less able to project a distinctive approach to market-oriented reforms, and to deflect the blame for growing economic insecurity and inequality. The more neoliberal and confrontational posture adopted by the OVP clearly helped the SPOinthe 1995 election.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, the Austrian and Swedish cases are too different from each other to allow us to establish a parsimonious explanation for the divergent fortunes of social-democratic parties and labour movements. At the same time, the comparison of these cases generates many conceptual distinctions and causal arguments that are relevant to the questions which were raised at the outset. Focusing on the question of explaining electoral performance, we have identified several conditions pertaining to employment structure and labour-market dynamics that might be invoked to explain the contrast between the decline of Austrian social democracy and Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 the stability of Swedish social democracy. As these conditions are closely related to one another, they should perhaps be conceived not as discrete independent variables, but rather as the constitutive elements of what might be called a 'causal syndrome'. A second set of conditions, similarly related to one another, that might be invoked to explain the divergent fortunes of Austrian and Swedish social democracy pertain to the structure and dynamics of competition in the political arena.
Starting with conditions of political competition, three main points emerge from the preceding discussion. First, the existence of a party to the left of social democracy, with strong working-class roots, has traditionally forced the Swedish SAP to worry about appeasing its left-leaning constituencies and has served as a vehicle of protest voting, pre-empting the abandonment of social democracy for right-wing populism that we have observed in Austria. Second, the aggressive advocacy of neo-liberal ideas by Swedish employers and the non-socialist parties in the 1980s and 1990s provided a foil for the SAP, enabling the party to project itself as representing a distinctive (socially responsible) approach to economic 'modernisation'. By comparison, Austrian politics would seem to be distinguished by the absence of clearly delineated policy alternatives. Third, the timing of business cycles and alterations in government have been extremely fortuitous for the Swedish social democrats. Governing continuously since 1971, the Austrian social democrats have been unable to shift the blame for economic stagnation, insecurity and growing inequality to other political forces.
The labour-market conditions which we have shown to be relevant are essentially the following: (1) the public sector accounts for a much larger proportion of total employment in Sweden than in Austria; (2) by the 1980s, union density is much higher in Sweden than in Austria; (3) wage solidarity has been a core feature of union ideology in Sweden but not in Austria, and Swedish wage differentials, especially gender differentials, are more compressed than Austrian wage differentials; and (4) female labour-force participation is much higher and working women are more likely to belong to unions in Sweden than in Austria. Again, the expanding public sector was the principal source of new job opportunities for Swedish women in the 1960s and 1970s, and women account for about two-thirds of public-sector employees in Sweden. In both countries, public-sector employees are more likely to belong to unions than private-sector employees, especially people working in private services, and both public-sector employment and union membership correlate strongly with voting for the Left. (Over the period studied here, these correlations have not changed that much.)
In Sweden, public-sector unions have been particularly solidaristic in their approach to wage bargaining, and public-sector employers (often Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06:23 20 January 2015 social-democratic government officials) have been more willing to accommodate solidaristic wage demands than their private-sector counterparts. 45 With civil servants (Beamte) accounting for a larger share of public-sector employment, the dynamics of public-sector wage bargaining have been different in Austria, but even here pay differentials for men and women in the same jobs are much smaller in the public sector than the private sector. In general, the larger size of the public sector takes us some way towards explaining why wage differentials are more compressed in Sweden than in Austria, and wage solidarity might in turn be invoked to explain the success of Swedish unions in organising women -and poorly paid men as well, of course.
To reiterate, it is not the case that the SPO's appeal to women is weaker than its appeal to men -in fact, the opposite is true in the 1990s. In comparison with the SAP, what is distinctive about the SPO is that its appeal to housewives and retired women is much stronger than its appeal to working women (see Table 5 ). This is, of course, closely related to the fact that the SPO does much better among older people, and that its electorate has aged more than the SAP electorate over the last 15-20 years.
The question of why unionised wage earners are more likely than nonunionised wage earners to support social-democratic parties lies beyond the scope of this article, but our analysis clearly suggests that strong unions remain an important electoral asset for social-democratic parties. This brings us back to Kitschelt's contention that unions constitute an obstacle to strategic innovation and electoral success for these parties. In terms of union strength or influence in society at large, there can be no doubt that the Swedish labour movement is stronger than its Austrian counterpart. In terms of union influence within the party, the comparison of the two cases is less clear-cut, but it would be difficult to argue that the SPO has been significantly more union-dominated than the SAP in the post-war period.
This said, our analysis is entirely consistent with a modified version of Kitschelt's thesis. Drawing on the logic of Mancur Olson's argument about 'encompassment', 46 one might argue that union influence over party decisions constitutes an obstacle to strategic innovation and electoral success to the extent that unions represent the particularistic interests, perhaps privileges, of certain segments of the labour force (and the electorate). Furthermore, the two dimensions of union influence that we have distinguished are not entirely separate, for unions that represent only a small segment of the labour force are unlikely to have a strong voice in party politics. Thus the problem of union-induced strategic rigidity should be most pronounced when traditionally strong unions undergo rapid membership losses. The Austrian case would seem to exemplify this situation; further comparative research would enable us to determine Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 06: 23 20 January 2015 whether the argument applies more generally.
The preceding discussion does not provide a definitive explanation of the decline in union membership in Austria, but it suggests, contrary to the conventional view, that corporatism (at least a certain type of corporatism) may curtail the inclination and/or ability of unions to mobilise new categories of wage earners. As noted above, the Austrian Kammer system reduces the incentives for wage earners to belong to unions. Also, our analysis suggests that corporatist arrangements have preserved the dominance of privileged worker groups -in particular, skilled men working in nationalised industry -within the labour movement, and thus rendered Austrian unions less responsive than their Swedish counterparts to other wage-earner interests.
